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We explore the international spillovers from fiscal policy shocks via trade in Europe. A fiscal 
expansion stimulates domestic activity, which leads to more foreign exports and, hence, higher foreign 
output. To quantify this, we combine a panel VAR model in government spending, net taxes and GDP 
with a panel trade model. On average, a public spending increase equal to 1% of GDP implies 2.3% 
more foreign exports over the first two years. The corresponding figure for an equal-size net tax 
reduction is 0.6%. Both estimates are statistically significant. As far as the effect on foreign activity is 
concerned, a 1% of GDP spending increase (net tax reduction) in Germany on average raises GDP of 
trading partners by 0.23% (0.06%) over the first two years. These figures are likely to form lower 
bounds for the actual effects and suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the benefits 
from coordinated fiscal expansions (contractions) in response to European-wide cyclical downturns 
(upswings). 
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1. Introduction
∗ 
Macroeconomic coordination of fiscal policies is a recurring theme in policy discussions. Recent 
developments have given a new impulse to these discussions. In particular, the move to a common 
monetary policy in Europe has quite naturally raised the question whether European fiscal policies 
should be more tightly coordinated.
1 The importance of this question is likely to increase further in the 
future owing to ongoing financial and trade integration. 
The practical case for fiscal coordination rests in the first place on the empirical importance of 
spillovers from national fiscal policies. In this paper, we shall explore the relevance of international 
trade for the cross-border transmission of fiscal shocks within the European Union (EU). Despite the 
relevance of this issue, to the best of our knowledge, such fiscal spillovers have hardly received any 
attention in empirical work. Moreover, while many recent analyses of the effects of fiscal impulses 
have to rely on relatively small samples and/or on quarterly fiscal data,
2 in this paper we use a panel 
involving bilateral trade flows between countries over a relatively large number of years. The resulting 
dataset is large and we thus avoid the need to resort to potentially unreliable quarterly fiscal data. 
Further, with the use of bilateral trade data, we avoid potential biases caused by the aggregation of 
trade flows over countries. 
The empirical analysis is based on the conjecture that a fiscal expansion stimulates domestic 
activity, which leads to more domestic imports and thus more exports by other countries. This, in turn, 
boosts foreign income. Our quantification of these effects is innovative along several dimensions. We 
combine a panel vector auto-regression (PVAR) model, which allows us to identify the fiscal shocks 
and to compute the responses of output to these shocks, with a panel trade model for the effect of 
output on bilateral foreign exports, to calculate the ‘full’ effect of a fiscal impulse on bilateral foreign 
exports. The advantages of this approach are that we can (1) combine two models with different 
dimensionality and (2) disentangle the contributions of the various channels leading to the overall 
trade spillover of fiscal policy. Finally, both the fiscal and the trade models allow for substantial 
deterministic heterogeneity. 
The panel VAR model shows that both an increase in government spending (i.e. government 
consumption plus investment) and a reduction in net taxes (i.e. revenues minus transfers) give a 
significant boost to domestic economic activity, which persists for some years. The panel trade 
estimates reveal a significantly positive effect of domestic output on foreign exports, which dies out 
                                                      
∗    We thank Maurice Bun, Peter Boswijk, Peter Claeys, seminar participants at the University of Amsterdam and 
participants of the third MAPMU-RTN Conference (London Business School) and at the third Quantititative 
Macroeconomics Workshop (University of Cologne) for helpful comments and discussions. Part of this paper was written 
while Beetsma was visiting the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence. He thanks the 
RSC for its hospitality and its excellent research environment. This research is part of the RTN project ‘Macroeconomic 
Policy Design for Monetary Unions’, funded by the European Commission (contract number HPRN-CT-2002-00237). 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
1   For example, Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry (2001) argue strongly in favor of enhanced European fiscal coordination. One area 
they consider explicitly is the response of fiscal policy to economic shocks. 
2   The quality of such data is not undisputed, because it is often not clear how the data are constructed (many fiscal series at 
the quarterly level are interpolated from annual or semi-annual data). Moreover, since new budgets are usually presented 
at yearly intervals (though sometimes they may be revised during the course of the year), fiscal shocks identified in 
quarterly data may be hard to interpret economically. Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen 
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after one year. Combining the two models, the average overall effect of a public spending increase 
equal to 1% of GDP is 2.3% more foreign exports over the first two years. The corresponding figure 
for an equal-size net tax reduction is 0.6%. Both estimates are statistically significant. As far as the 
effect on foreign activity is concerned, a 1% of GDP spending increase (net tax reduction) in Germany 
on average raises GDP of trading partners by 0.23% (0.06%) over the first two years. Given that we 
ignore further feedback effects among the economies as well as foreign multiplier effects from an 
export stimulus, these figures likely form lower bounds on the actual effects. 
In this paper, we follow a ‘partial’ approach and focus on the cross-border spillovers of fiscal 
policy via trade, largely ignoring other potential spillovers.
3 In particular, we shall ignore possible 
spillovers via changes in the interest rate.
4 There are several reasons to motivate this choice. First, the 
possibility of positive spillovers of fiscal expansions via trade have received much less attention in the 
discussions surrounding the European fiscal framework than the negative spillovers via a rise in the 
common interest rate. Second, especially in the case of Europe, the trade channel may well be more 
important than the interest rate channel. One reason is that the spillovers via trade are mostly confined 
to Europe, because intra-European trade is substantially larger than trade crossing the European 
border. Further, to the extent that the European capital market is integrated with the capital market in 
the rest of the world, the interest rate increase following a debt-financed fiscal expansion in some 
European country is diluted.
5 Apart from this, the type of coordination that we have in mind concerns 
a joint fiscal expansion when there is widespread recession in Europe or, vice versa, when most 
European economies are booming. Such coordinated expansions and contractions would leave the 
public debt roughly constant over the cycle and the effect on interest rates would at most be minor. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant 
literature. Then, Section 3 presents the set up of the empirical model, after which we estimate the 
panel-VAR and panel-trade models. In Section 4 we combine the impulse responses from the two 
models to obtain the responses of the fiscal impulses on trade and on foreign output. Finally, Section 5 
concludes this paper. 
2. Literature Review 
Various articles use simulations of calibrated models to assess the trade spillovers from fiscal policy. 
For example, Gros and Hobza (2001) do this for Europe for a number of widely used multi-country 
models. In’t Veld (2004) employs the European Commission’s QUEST model to explore the 
spillovers from a German spending contraction. However, there exists only a limited amount of 
empirical work that provides econometric estimates of such trade spillovers. A possible reason is that 
it is hard to disentangle the various channels through which fiscal policy can spill over to other 
                                                      
3   For a recent theoretical analysis of the various spillovers from fiscal policy in the context of a model of a monetary union, 
see Huart (2002). 
4   Theoretically, a fiscal expansion can generate a spillover via both the common short-run and the common long-run 
interest rate. If the expansion puts upward pressure on inflation, the ECB is forced to raise the short interest rate. If public 
debt rises, then the long-run interest rate may go up. 
5   We might expect a spillover of the interest rate increase to other countries if the increase is the result of crowding out 
(that is, the total demand for funds increases). If the rise in the interest rate is caused by an increase in the likelihood of 
default, then there is a priori no reason that the rise should be transmitted to other countries. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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countries, making it difficult to find significant spillover effects (e.g., see McKibbin, 1997). 
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. 
In a study that is closest to the current one, Giuliodori and Beetsma (2004) find a substantial 
number of cases of statistically and economically significant trade spillovers resulting from fiscal 
impulses in large EU countries. They extend recent empirical work that assesses the macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal impulses, by incorporating imports and exchange rates into the VARs used in this line 
of research. The main differences with the current paper are that here we disentangle the effects of 
fiscal policy on output and of output on foreign trade, use panel models, and take annual instead of 
quarterly data. 
In a related study, Marcellino (2002) estimates VARs that include the German output gap and 
German fiscal policy together with the corresponding variables for other large European countries. He 
finds only small and insignificant effects of German fiscal shocks on the other economies. Other 
related work by Canzoneri et al. (2003) uses a VAR to explore the effects of changes in U.S. fiscal 
policy on output in France, Italy and the United Kingdom. They find that the spillover effect of a 
government spending shock is quite large for all three countries. However, in contrast to our paper, 
these studies do not assess and quantify the specific channels through which the spillovers may take place. 
Lane and Perotti (1998) explore the short-run impact of movements in different components of 
fiscal policy on the trade balance, exports and imports. They do so for a large panel of countries over 
the period 1960-1995 and find that fiscal policy exerts significant short-run effects on the trade 
balance. In particular, shifts in wage government consumption seem to affect the external account 
significantly, an effect that is stronger under flexible exchange rates. In contrast to our paper, Lane and 
Perotti (1998) only use aggregate trade flows and thus forego the specific advantages of using bilateral 
trade flows. Lane and Perotti (2003) investigate the effects of fiscal expansions for the traded sector 
and find that increases in wage government spending raise the real product wage and depress 
profitability in the traded sector, above all under a flexible exchange rate regime. While not 
specifically focused on the external account and spillovers, the results suggest that spending increases 
can have positive cross-border spillovers by making foreign countries’ traded sector more competitive. 
In a VAR analysis for the G3 countries (over the period 1975-1996), Clarida and Prendergast 
(1999) find that generally a fiscal expansion first leads to a real exchange rate appreciation, followed 
by a depreciation, during which the real exchange rate overshoots, before it returns to its original level. 
Kim and Roubini (2003) use a VAR analysis for the U.S. after Bretton Woods and find that an 
expansionary fiscal shock improves the current account and depreciates the real exchange rate. This is 
in contrast to what the standard Mundell-Fleming model would predict. Related empirical work by 
Müller (2004) shows that the U.S. trade balance improves and the nominal exchange rate depreciates 
after a temporary spending shock. 
The estimation of the effect of fiscal impulses on foreign exports requires us to assess the 
consequences of fiscal impulses for economic activity. Here, we build on the recent literature that uses 
VAR analysis to identify fiscal shocks and to trace their effects through the economy based on 
impulse-response analysis. While, theoretically, the effect of public spending increases on economic 
activity can go both ways,
6 existing empirical evidence points to the dominance of Keynesian effects. 
                                                      
6   For example, in the context of a real business cycle framework, Baxter and King (1993) show that a public spending 
increase financed by lump-sum taxes may raise GDP, while a spending increase financed by distortionary taxes leads to a Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen 
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Examples are Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Galí et al. (2003) for the U.S., who find that private 
consumption increases in response to a public spending increase. Related studies by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2002) and Perotti (2005) confirm the short-run stimulus obtained 
not only from government spending increases, but also from net tax reductions.
7 
3. The Empirical Set-up and the Estimates of the Fiscal and Trade Blocks 
To estimate the overall effect of domestic fiscal impulses on exports by trading partners in Europe, in 
this section we first estimate a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model in which the responses of 
output to discretionary fiscal shocks are traced out. To fix terminology, we will henceforth refer to this 
model as the fiscal block. Subsequently, we set up a panel trade model in which the dynamic 
responses of bilateral exports by the neighbouring countries to domestic output are estimated. We shall 
refer to this model as the trade block. In the next section, we combine the results of the trade block and 
fiscal block to obtain the full effect of fiscal impulses on bilateral exports. Finally, we translate the 
export impacts into changes in foreign output. 
By estimating the fiscal and trade blocks separately and then combining the respective outcomes, 
we circumvent the difficulty that the two models have different dimensions, because the fiscal block 
concerns the domestic economy only, whereas the trade block deals with the interactions between 
pairs of countries. An additional advantage of estimating these models separately is that this allows us 
to disentangle the sizes of each step going from the fiscal impulse to the foreign bilateral export and 
the eventual foreign output effect.
8 
While the advantage of using panels is that we increase the number of observations, the 
disadvantage, of course, is that we have to impose certain homogeneity restrictions. By focusing on 
EU countries only, we intend to limit the potential heterogeneity, as the economies share many 
similarities. Moreover, as we describe below, we allow for extensive deterministic heterogeneity. 
Finally, the specifications of the fiscal and trade blocks depend on the time horizon of the 
spillovers that we want to analyse. Given that we are primarily interested in assessing the potential 
desirability of joint fiscal responses to business cycle movements, we are mostly interested in the 
short- and medium-run economic effects of the fiscal impulses. Therefore, both the fiscal and trade 
models are dynamic instead of static. 
3.1. The Fiscal Block 
The fiscal block is captured by a PVAR model, which in its structural form is given by: 
 
(Contd.)                                                                   
contraction of GDP. For recent surveys of the potential ways in which fiscal policy changes affect economic activity, see 
Hemming et al. (2002) or Andersen (2004). 
7   Other relevant contributions to this expanding literature include Canova and Pappa (2002), Favero (2003), Burnside et al. 
(2000), Van Aarle et al. (2003), Claeys (2004) and Muscatelli et al. (2004). It should be noted that the aforementioned 
contributions mostly look at the effects of fiscal impulses under ‘normal’ circumstances. Periods of fiscal distress may 
well show non-Keynesian effects of fiscal changes. In particular, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) - followed by a large 
number of other papers (e.g., Perotti, 1999) - suggest that fiscal contractions can actually be expansionary. 
8   In one experiment, we combined the fiscal and trade blocks in a single, huge panel VAR. The impulse responses were 
very similar to those described below. This provides another reason to keep the blocks separate. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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where  it Z  is an (1 ) m×  vector of endogenous variables,  0 A  is an () mm ×  matrix with 1’s on the 
diagonal. It contains the structural parameters that capture the contemporaneous relations among the 
endogenous variables. Further,  () A L  is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L , and  it e  is the 
structural disturbance vector. Pre-multiplying (1) by 
1
0 A
− , we obtain the reduced form as: 
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The model specification follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in that  [] ,,' it it it it Z gn ty = , where 
it g  is real public spending,  it nt  is real net taxes (revenues minus transfers) and  it y  is real total output, 
all in natural logarithms. We set the lag length of the system to two and estimate the PVAR for 11 EU 
countries over the period 1965-2002 (see the Appendix for details).
9 To derive the impulse responses 
of output to the structural shocks of the system, we have to impose three identifying restrictions. Let  
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it u  are the reduced-form residuals. 
As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and in Perotti (2005), in our baseline panel-VAR specification, 
we make use of information on the elasticities of the various components of net taxes with respect to 
output. Using this information, which is available on a country-by-country basis from Van den Noord 
(2000), we purge each component of net taxes of its cyclical component. Adding up the cyclically 
adjusted components then yields the cyclically adjusted net taxes (see the Appendix for more details). 
This variable thus takes account of the fact that the tax elasticities differ across countries. By including 
cyclically adjusted net taxes we can impose that the reaction of this variable to output is zero,  0 ty a = , 
which provides us with one identifying restriction. Another advantage of making these country-
specific cyclical adjustments to net taxes is that this should enable us to more accurately identify the 
country-specific discretionary tax shocks. If the elasticities of net taxes to output indeed differ across 
countries, then imposing homogeneity by estimating  ty a  would lead us to identify as the net tax 
shocks combinations of the true shock and the country-specific part of the cyclical reaction of net 
taxes to output. 
                                                      
9   We include country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific linear time trends. With a panel with large T, 
ordinary least-square (OLS) estimation with country fixed effects and country-specific linear time trends yields consistent 
estimates. Alesina et al. (2002) and Ardagna et al. (2004) estimate panel VARs for similar country and period samples. Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen 
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We obtain two additional identifying restrictions with the assumption that public spending 
(government consumption plus government investment) does not react to contemporaneous changes in 
(cyclically adjusted) net taxes (agt = 0) and output (agy = 0). These assumptions seem reasonable given 
that spending plans are usually determined in a government budget that is presented before the new 
fiscal year starts. (Note that while government transfers, in particular, unemployment benefits, may be 
sensitive to the cycle, these are not included in our measure of government expenditure). The 
restriction  agt  = 0 implies that public spending is ‘ordered first’ in the VAR. An alternative 
orthogonalization would be to order net taxes first. However, as in Alesina et al. (2002), it turns out 
that the correlation between the reduced-form innovations of the public spending and net tax equations 
is very small. Hence, the specific ordering of the two fiscal variables vis-à-vis each other has no 
bearing on the results. In what follows, we always order public spending first. 
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where the superscript ‘CA’ is used to denote that the variable is cyclically adjusted. For notational 
simplicity, we do not attach this superscript to the structural shock 
nt
it e  nor to the coefficients that are 
affected by the switch to cyclically adjusted net taxes. 
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the unrestricted coefficients in 
(4) over the full sample period 1965-2002. We take this as the baseline case for the panel VAR. The 
results indicate that government spending has no contemporaneous effect on cyclically adjusted net 
taxes. By contrast, and as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002, Figures III and V) for the U.S., a 
government spending increase and a net tax cut exert a highly significant positive effect on current 
output. We show the corresponding impulse responses in Figure 1, where we normalize the fiscal 
shocks to be equal to 1% of GDP. In both instances, output rises significantly upon impact and the 
increase remains significant for three years after the net tax shock and for much longer after the 
spending impulse. In case of the latter, net taxes rise significantly, although with some lag. The 
positive effect on net taxes is probably best explained by the need for budgetary sustainability. 
In order to assess the robustness of the baseline model, we have also estimated (4) in first 
differences. In addition, we have estimated a number of plausible variants on (4). Basically, all cases 
yield the same conclusions. In one variant, following the results of the baseline model, we impose atg = 
0 and relax one by one the contemporaneous zero restrictions on agt, agy and atv. Another variant 
replaces output (GDP) in (4) with the log of real private output  py , that is, GDP minus government 
expenditures. The objective is to see if a spending impulse causes significant multiplier effects on 
output. We realize that this approach is not entirely accurate, because we subtract from output also the 
component of government spending that falls on foreign products. However, this component is 
generally small, so that our measure of private output is close to the conceptually correct one. We 
report the estimates in column 2 of Table 1 and the impulse responses in Figure 2. Not surprisingly, 
the response of private output to a spending increase is weaker than before, though it is still 
significant. Hence, this indicates the presence of multiplier effects. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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As another variation on the baseline, we have estimated (4) for the sub-sample period 1980-2002. 
The reason is that Galí and Perotti (2003) and Perotti (2005) find that the effects of fiscal policy 
changes could have become different over time. Table 1, column 3, reports the results for this case, 
while Figure 3 shows the impulse responses. The effect of a net tax reduction has become much 
weaker (though its impact effect on output is still significantly positive), whereas the response of 
output to a public spending shock has slightly increased, although it now dies out more quickly. 
Finally, we have extended the baseline model with the (log) price level, the short-run interest rate 
and (log) real multilateral exchange rate. One cannot a priori exclude the possibility that fiscal shocks 
influence the dynamics of economic activity by affecting these variables. In particular, it could be 
important to include an exchange rate, because in a large part of the sample exchange rates were not 
fixed. We order the price level first, because prices tend to be sticky and budgets are generally set in 
nominal terms. A price increase would reduce real government spending within the same year (and 
could affect real tax revenues through bracket creep). The real exchange rate is ordered last, because 
(through the nominal exchange rate) it is expected to react instantaneously to changes in other macro-
economic variables. The interest rate is ordered next-to-last. The impulse responses of output (and the 
fiscal variables) are very similar to the baseline responses (compare Figure 4 to Figure 1), which 
supports our choice to proceed with the baseline specification in the remainder of the analysis. We 
observe that the price level and the interest rate start rising and become significant one to two years 
after the spending or tax shock. They reach their peaks some years later. The increase in the short 
interest rate most likely results from the desire of the central banks to counteract inflationary 
pressures. The real exchange rate is hardly affected, except perhaps (with a depreciation) within a year 
after the tax shock. We also estimated a version of the model with a long-run interest rate replacing the 
short-run interest rate and we estimated a version in which both the short and the long interest rate 
were included together. The impulse responses are virtually unchanged, while the long interest rate 
behaves in much the same way as the short interest rate. This is not surprising given the strong 
empirical correlation that is usually found between the short and long end of the term structure. 
3.2. The Trade Block 
The second step is to estimate the trade block. It is based on the gravity model of trade – see 
Bergstrand (1989) for a description and theoretical motivation of this model. Because we are 
interested in the short- and medium-run effects of fiscal impulses, our baseline panel trade model 
extends the standard gravity model by allowing for dynamics using the following autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) specification with n=2 lags: 
 




ji t s ji t s s i t s s ji t s ji t
sss
xx y r e r βββ ε −− −
===
=++ + ∑∑∑       ( 5 )  
 
where xji,t is (the log of) bilateral real exports at time t from country j (the foreign country) to i (the 
home country), yi,t-s (yj,t-s) is (the log of) real output in the home (foreign) country, and rerji,t-s is the (log 
of the) bilateral real exchange rate between country j and country i. It is defined such that, if rerji,t-s 
rises, then the currency of country j (the exporting country) depreciates in real terms against the 
currency of county i. The model also contains – though not shown in equation (5) – fixed effects for Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen 
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the country-pair ji that capture the impact of all time-invariant determinants of trade (such as distance, 
a common border, a common language, etc., as in the gravity model). Further, we include fixed time 
effects to control for, among other things, the general state of the world economy, and have country-
pair specific linear time trends representing potentially omitted trending determinants of exports (such 
as transportation costs and trade liberalization), as motivated in Bun and Klaassen (2003). Following 
standard practice in the trade literature (see e.g. Rose, 2000, and Glick and Rose, 2002), we add 
dummies EUji,t and FTAji,t. The former dummy scores one if at time t  both j and i are members of the 
European Union (or the European Community, before the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty), and 
zero otherwise. Similarly, FTAji,t is a dummy equal to one if there is a free trade agreement between j 
and i at time t. Finally, εji,t is a zero-mean random variable which may be heteroskedastic (over time 
and country pairs), but is assumed to be uncorrelated over time and country pairs. 
We estimate the model by OLS (see Panopoulou and Pittis, 2004, for theoretical and empirical 
support). Again the data set covers the period 1965-2002. It accounts for all bilateral trade 
relationships between the 11 EU countries used in the fiscal block, providing us with 110 country pairs 
(see the Appendix for the further details). 
Table 2, column 1 presents the estimates for the parameters of interest in (5). Bilateral exports are 
highly correlated with bilateral exports one year earlier. A real depreciation of the exporting country’s 
currency (i.e. a rise in rerji,t) has a strong positive effect on bilateral exports from j to i; the long-run 
effect  30 31 32 11 12 () / ( 1 ) βββ ββ ++ −−  is 0.768 with a standard error of 0.077 (not reported in the 
table). Similarly, an increase in real GDP of country i, the importing country, exerts a strong positive 
effect (the long-run effect is 0.754 with standard error 0.154). Finally, in the long run, membership of 
a free trade area leads to 28% (standard error 4%) more trade and membership of the European Union 
stimulates trade by an additional 16% (standard error 3%). These effects are substantial. 
To see how the long-run effects materialize over time, we plot the impulse responses of bilateral 
exports from the foreign to the domestic country to shocks in bilateral exports, domestic output and 
the real exchange rate (see Figure 5). The size of the shock is a 1% increase in the variable under 
consideration. As expected, the effects of an increase in domestic output on bilateral exports are 
positive and strongly significant on impact. A 1% real depreciation of the foreign currency leads to a 
statistically significant 0.5% increase in foreign exports on impact. However, these effects die out 
quickly. The effect of the real exchange rate impulse has disappeared after two years, while the effect 
of the output shock vanishes already after one year. The accumulation of the impulse responses over 
time thus gives the long-run estimates presented above. 
Column 2 in Table 2 reports the estimates when we add as explanatory variables in the panel trade 
model the domestic discretionary government spending shocks that we identified from the fiscal block. 
It is conceivable that the government buys part of a spending increase directly from abroad, in which 
case the discretionary government spending shock should enter with a positive coefficient in the trade 
equation. However, the estimates show that the discretionary spending impulse exerts no direct effect 
on bilateral exports from the foreign country. This is not surprising, because by far most of 
government spending falls on domestic goods and services. Incidentally, we note that the government 
spending shock is a generated regressor in the trade model. Hence, if correctly computed, the standard 
errors would exceed those reported in Table 2, which would reinforce our finding that the government 
spending shock has no significant direct effect on foreign exports. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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We have estimated a number of additional variations on the baseline, motivated by trade model 
specifications elsewhere in the literature. First, we add real GDP of the exporting country j. Column 3 
of Table 2 shows the estimates. We conclude that there is no indication that foreign output matters for 
foreign exports, which motivates us to retain our baseline specification. Second, we have also 
estimated specifications in which we added to the baseline real GDP per capita of country i or country 
j (to control for the effect of the welfare level) or a measure of bilateral real exchange rate volatility. 
The estimates are not reported here, but none of these variables came out significantly. This result 
differs somewhat from what is usually found in the empirical trade literature. The reason is probably 
that we use a dynamic instead of a static model. Indeed, if we follow the usual procedure of estimating 
static models and not adjusting the standard errors for serial correlation in the residuals, then all the 
variables just mentioned have a significant impact. Because we find clear evidence of dynamics (see 
Table 2), we prefer to stick again with our baseline specification. 
4. Combining the Fiscal and the Trade Blocks 
By combining the estimates for the trade block with those for the fiscal block, we can compute the 
overall effect of a domestic fiscal impulse on foreign bilateral exports to the home country. In 
principle, the effect can operate both through output and through the real exchange rate. However, we 
set the effect through the second channel to zero. The reason is that we want to assess the spillovers of 
a fiscal impulse under the current regime of a monetary union in Europe. With a common currency 
and sticky prices, we can expect only very limited short-run movements in real exchange rates. 




it it yL e =Ψ           ( 6 )  
where  () L Ψ  is a lag polynomial and 
f
it e  is the discretionary fiscal shock (
f g
it it ee =  or 
f nt
it it ee = ). The 
coefficients of  () L Ψ  are functions of the estimates of the parameters from the fiscal block. They 
show how a fiscal shock affects domestic output over time. 
The trade model provides the link between domestic output and bilateral exports of the foreign 
country, where the response function is the distributed-lag function: 
 
() , , jit i t x DLy =           ( 7 )  
where the coefficients in the lag polynomial  () DL are a function of the estimated parameters of the 
trade model.  
Combining (6) and (7), we calculate the effects of the discretionary fiscal shock in country i on 
bilateral exports from country j to country i as 
 
() () , .
f
jit i t x DL Le =Ψ         ( 8 )  
Hence, we compute the impulse responses of bilateral exports to the fiscal shock by simply 
multiplying the lag polynomials  () L Ψ  and  () DL. Figure 6 shows these impulse responses. The Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen 
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effect of a domestic spending shock is significantly positive for several years and reaches its 
maximum after one year. A net-tax cut also produces a significant increase in net exports. However, 
the effect is smaller and shorter-lived than that of an equal-sized spending increase. 
Table 3 reports the cumulative effects on foreign exports of the domestic fiscal shock. A relevant 
question is what is the appropriate horizon for assessing the effects of the shock. As explained earlier, 
we are primarily interested in the short- and medium-run consequences of fiscal impulses. Therefore, 
Table 3 reports impact effects and cumulative responses after two and after five years. For a 1% of 
GDP spending increase, which amounts to an increase in public spending of slightly over 4%, the 
cumulative export effect after two years is a significant increase of 7.8% of one year’s exports. For an 
equally-sized net tax reduction, the (significant) gain in exports amounts to 1.4%. 
A complication in assessing the gains from a fiscal impulse is that, after the shock, fiscal policy 
continues to deviate from its original value. It can be reasonably argued that these subsequent 
deviations should be added to the initial spending shock in order to obtain the total budgetary cost of 
the cumulative export gain. Table 3 also reports the ‘normalized’ response, which, loosely speaking, 
divides the cumulative gain in exports by the cumulative deviation of government spending from its 
original level.
10 Over a two-year horizon there is an export gain of 2.3% of a year’s exports for each 
1% of GDP additional spending. The corresponding figure for a net tax reduction is 0.6%. Both 
figures are significant. 
By combining the cumulative and normalized responses of the bilateral foreign exports to fiscal 
shocks with the actual shares of bilateral foreign exports in foreign output, we can calculate the effects 
of domestic spending and net tax shocks on foreign output. Tables 4 and 5 display the cumulative and 
normalized responses of EU countries’ output to a spending increase or net tax reduction in the two 
largest economies in the Euro area (Germany and France). The computation of these responses is 
analogous to those for the net exports responses in Table 3. The reported figures are only indicative in 
that they do not account for potential multiplier effects of exports on foreign economic activity nor for 
further feedback effects among the economies. Hence, the figures reported here likely form only a 
lower bound on the actual size of the trade spillovers.
11 Nevertheless, Tables 4 and 5 indicate that a 
German fiscal expansion (especially a spending shock) has strong effects on its small neighbours. An 
increase in public spending (a decrease in net taxes) by 1% of GDP in Germany leads to a more than 
0.4% (0.1%) normalized increase in GDP of Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg and the Netherlands after 
two years. In accordance with the gravity model, the effects on these countries are larger than the 
effects on other small countries that are further away and do not share a common border with 
Germany. Averaged across all partner countries, the normalized effect of a German fiscal stimulus is 
0.23% (0.06%) of foreign GDP. Naturally, the spillover effects of a French fiscal impulse are smaller 
(on average, roughly half of the size of the spillovers from the German shock), but they are still non-
negligible. In general, and not surprisingly, the trade spillovers of fiscal shocks are larger, the stronger 
the bilateral trade links. 
                                                      
10  The details of the computation are contained in the Notes to Table 3. 
11  Computation of the complete spillover effects is complicated and, therefore, left for future research. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we explored the empirical importance of trade spillovers from fiscal policy shocks in the 
European Union. The magnitude of these trade spillovers is important for assessing whether more 
fiscal coordination is desirable. On the one hand, stronger spillovers imply that a larger share of the 
fiscal stimulus leaks away, thus reducing the incentive to give a unilateral fiscal impulse. On the other 
hand, the benefit from mutually internalizing the externality associated with a concerted fiscal impulse 
increases. Thus, the benefit from a coordinated fiscal response to a widespread European recession 
becomes larger. Our estimates suggest that, measured over a two-year horizon, a domestic fiscal 
impulse equal to 1% of GDP leads to a gain of 2.3% of a year’s bilateral exports by EU trading 
partners for a public spending shock and 0.6% for a net tax shock. Averaged across EU partners, the 
corresponding output gain of a fiscal stimulus in Germany is 0.23% in case of a spending increase and 
0.06% for a net tax cut. All these figures are significant and, as we have argued, they likely form a 
lower bound on the actual effects. 
In order to obtain these estimates, we followed a rather unconventional two-step procedure. In the 
first step, we identified the discretionary fiscal shocks from a panel VAR and computed impulse 
responses to these shocks. The second step comprised the estimation of a panel trade model, from 
which we obtained the effects of changes in domestic output on foreign exports. Upon merging the 
responses from the two blocks, we could compute the overall effect of the fiscal impulses on bilateral 
exports and thereby on output of other EU countries.  
The preceding analysis admits a number of extensions. For example, when estimating the 
consequences of the fiscal shocks, one could also take account of the multiplier effects in foreign 
output caused by the rise in foreign exports. Another extension would be to allow for feedback effects 
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Appendix: Data Sources and Description 
Data sources are the Economic Outlook (EO) of the OECD Statistical Compendium; the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Database; and the Direction of 
Trade Statistics (DOTS). 
Fiscal variables  
The EO provides time series at annual frequency for the following variables: 
CGAA   =  Government Consumption 
IGAA    =   Fixed Investment, Government  
PCG     =  Deflator, Public Consumption (base year 1995 =100) 
PIG     =  Deflator, Fixed Investment, Government (base year 1995 =100) 
TIND   =  Indirect  Taxes 
TSUB   =  Subsidies 
TY   =  Direct  Taxes 
SSPG     =   Social Benefits Paid by Government 
TRPG    =   Other Current Transfers Paid by Government 
SSRG     =   Social Security Contributions Received by Government  
TRRG    =   Other Current Transfers Received by Government 
Additional variables 
GDP    =  Gross Domestic Product (Market Prices), Value 
PGDP    =  Deflator for GDP at Market Prices (base year 1995 =100) 
IRS    =  Short term interest rate 
 
From the above series, we construct the following variables: 
Y    =  Real GDP = GDP*100/PGDP 
G    =  Real Public Spending = CGAA*100/PCG + IGAA*100/PIG 
PY    =  Real Private GDP = Y – G 
REVENUES   =   TY + TIND + SSRG + TRRG 
TRANFERS   =   TSUB + SSPG + TRPG 
NT    =   Real Net Taxes = (REVENUES – TRANFERS)*100/PGDP 
Note that due to short data availability, for Ireland and the Netherlands TRPG and TRRG are not 
included in the calculation of REVENUES and TRANFERS.  Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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In order to cyclically adjust net taxes, we follow Alesina et al. (2002) and for each component of 
revenues and transfers at time t we compute: 
 
(/ ) ,
i CA NCA TR
it it t t RR Y Y
ξ =  
where superscripts CA, NCA and TR denote, respectively, ‘cyclically adjusted’, ‘non cyclically 
adjusted’ and ‘trend’, and ξ is the elasticity of component i with respect to real output. The OECD 
does not provide the transfers elasticity. Therefore, as in Alesina et al. (2002), we use the total primary 
expenditure elasticity and scale it up by the ratio of transfers to total primary spending. Additionally, 
we calculate trend GDP separately for each country by regressing log real GDP on a constant, a linear 
and a quadratic time trend.  
Trade variables 
The real bilateral export flows Xji from country j to country i in a given year are taken from Bun and 
Klaassen (2003) (updated with the year 2002). They are constructed as the sum of the monthly real 
exports, where the latter is the nominal value of exports in exporter’s currency divided by the 
exporter’s price index. The nominal value of exports in exporter’s currency is obtained by converting 
the original dollar denominated export values of the DOTS. The real bilateral exchange rate RERji is 
the average of the monthly real rates computed using nominal rates and the same exporter’s price 
indices as used above. The real multilateral exchange rate rer (used in the sensitivity analysis for the 
fiscal block) is the weighted average of the log of RERji in index form, using export shares as weights. 
The trade integration dummies EUji,t and FTAji,t are based on the dating of the membership of the EU 
or a free trade agreement used in Bun and Klaassen (2003). 
Variables used in the panel estimation 
p   = log(PGDP) 
y   = log(Y) 
py   = log(PY) 
i   = IRS 
rer   = log(RER) 
 
g    =   log(G) 
CA nt    =   log(NT
CA) 
 
ji x  =    log(Xji)  
ji rer    =   log(RERji)  
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Country and data samples: 
The ‘fiscal block’ is estimated for 11 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, and Sweden. Trade variables for Belgium 
include trade flows of Luxembourg. Denmark, Greece and Spain are excluded because the relevant 
fiscal variables are either missing or available only over a very short period. The estimation sample is 
1965-2002. The only exceptions are the United Kingdom and Belgium (1970), Ireland (1977) and the 
Netherlands (1969). 
The ‘trade block’ is estimated over the same period and accounts for all the bilateral trade 
relationships between the 11 countries above, leading to 110 country pairs.  Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Estimates of the contemporaneous coefficients of the fiscal block (4) 
































Sample period  1965-2002 1965-2002  1980-2002 
Panel size  11 11  11 
Observations  370 370  231 
Notes: the table shows the estimates of the coefficients (and their respective standard errors in parentheses) of the  0 A  matrix 
of equation (4). (*), (**) and (***) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2: Estimates of the bilateral export panel model (5) 
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, jt y      -0.035 
(0.148) 
,1 jt y −      0.081 
(0.245) 















Panel size  110 110  110 
Observations  3960 3610  3960 
 
Notes: the table shows the estimates of the coefficients (and their respective standard errors in parentheses) in alternative 
specifications of model (5). (*), (**) and (***) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Each model is estimated with time fixed effects, country-pair fixed effects and country-pair time trends. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2005/31 © 2005 Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen  19 
Table 3: Responses of foreign exports to domestic fiscal shocks– cumulative and ‘normalized’ 
Panel A: Spending increase (1% of GDP) 
 




















Point estimate  2.18 7.75  11.43  2.18 2.30 1.94 
Lower  (5%)  1.65 5.94 7.53 1.65 1.70 1.22 
Upper  (95%)  2.66 9.71  15.70  2.71 2.96 2.76 
 
 
Panel B: Net tax cut (1% of GDP) 
 




















Point estimate  0.40 1.37 0.81 0.40 0.57 0.26 
Lower  (5%)  0.18 0.48 -0.99 0.18 0.21 -0.31 
Upper  (95%)  0.62 2.29 2.68 0.61 0.96 0.89 
 
Notes: Numbers are based on 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. ‘Point estimate’ is the median value of the simulations, ‘Lower’ 
is the lower bound of the 90% confidence interval and ‘Upper’ is the upper bound of the 90% confidence interval. The fiscal 
shock that takes place at time 0 equals 1% of GDP. The ‘cumulative’ effect is the sum of the percentage deviations of exports 
from their original value. Specifically, after t years, it is given as  () 0 100* /
t
X XX τ τ = − ∑ , where  X  is the original 
value of the exports. The ‘normalized’ effect takes into account that the fiscal variable, after the initial shock, continues to 
deviate from its original value. Specifically, taking the case of a spending increase as an example, the normalized effect after 
t years is given by  () () 00 // /
tt
X XX GG Y ττ ττ ==
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −− ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∑∑ . Hence, this number can be interpreted as the 
average over the period 0 to t of additional exports per percent of output increase in public spending. For the computation we 
use average spending and net tax ratios of GDP over the whole sample. 
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Table 4: Cumulative response of foreign output to fiscal shocks in Germany and France 
Panel A: Spending increase (1% of GDP) 
 
  Origin of spending increase: 






















Austria  0.410 1.460 2.152 0.045 0.161 0.225 
Belgium-Lux  0.420 1.494 2.201 0.291 1.037 1.446 
Finland  0.139 0.494 0.728 0.043 0.153 0.213 
France   0.103 0.368 0.542  - - - 
Germany  - - -  0.076 0.270 0.376 
Ireland  0.197 0.701 1.033 0.109 0.387 0.539 
Italy  0.101 0.358 0.527 0.071 0.254 0.355 
Netherlands  0.403 1.435 2.114 0.134 0.476 0.663 
Portugal  0.161 0.574 0.845 0.084 0.301 0.419 
Sweden  0.127 0.451 0.664 0.051 0.183 0.254 
UK  0.095 0.338 0.498 0.065 0.230 0.321 
        
Average   0.216 0.767 1.130 0.097 0.345 0.481 
 
Panel B: Net tax cut (1% of GDP) 
 
  Origin of net tax cut: 





















Austria  0.078 0.268 0.158 0.008 0.027 0.023 
Belgium-Lux  0.080 0.274 0.162 0.050 0.172 0.146 
Finland  0.026 0.091 0.053 0.007 0.025 0.022 
France   0.020 0.068 0.040  - - - 
Germany  - - -  0.013 0.045 0.038 
Ireland  0.037 0.129 0.076 0.019 0.064 0.054 
Italy  0.019 0.066 0.039 0.012 0.042 0.036 
Netherlands  0.077 0.263 0.155 0.023 0.079 0.067 
Portugal  0.031 0.105 0.062 0.014 0.050 0.042 
Sweden  0.024 0.083 0.049 0.009 0.030 0.026 
UK  0.018 0.062 0.037 0.011 0.038 0.032 
          
Average   0.041 0.141 0.083 0.017 0.057 0.049 
 
Notes: Panel A (Panel B) shows the cumulative effect on foreign output (in percent) of a government spending increase (net 
tax cut) equal to 1 percentage point of GDP. In our computations we use bilateral exports, net taxes and government spending 
over GDP ratios for 2002. For details on the computations, see Notes to Table 3. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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Table 5: ‘Normalized’ foreign output multipliers of fiscal shocks in Germany and France 
Panel A: Spending increase (1% of GDP) 
 
  Origin of spending increase 























Austria  0.410 0.433 0.365 0.045 0.048 0.040 
Belgium-Lux  0.420 0.443 0.373 0.291 0.309 0.260 
Finland  0.139 0.147 0.123 0.043 0.046 0.038 
France   0.103 0.109 0.092  - - - 
Germany  - - -  0.076 0.080 0.068 
Ireland  0.197 0.208 0.175 0.109 0.115 0.097 
Italy  0.101 0.106 0.089 0.071 0.076 0.064 
Netherlands  0.403 0.425 0.358 0.134 0.142 0.119 
Portugal  0.161 0.170 0.143 0.084 0.090 0.075 
Sweden  0.127 0.134 0.113 0.051 0.054 0.046 
UK  0.095 0.100 0.084 0.065 0.069 0.058 
        
Average   0.216 0.227 0.192 0.097 0.103 0.087 
 
Panel B: Net tax cut (1% of GDP) 
 
  Origin of net tax cut 






















Austria  0.078 0.111 0.051 0.008 0.011 0.005 
Belgium-Lux  0.080 0.114 0.052 0.050 0.072 0.033 
Finland  0.026 0.038 0.017 0.007 0.011 0.005 
France   0.020 0.028 0.013  - - - 
Germany  -  - -  0.013 0.019 0.009 
Ireland  0.037 0.053 0.025 0.019 0.027 0.012 
Italy  0.019 0.027 0.013 0.012 0.018 0.008 
Netherlands  0.077 0.109 0.050 0.023 0.033 0.015 
Portugal  0.031 0.044 0.020 0.014 0.021 0.010 
Sweden  0.024 0.034 0.016 0.009 0.013 0.006 
UK  0.018 0.026 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.007 
        
Average   0.041 0.059 0.027 0.017 0.024 0.011 
 
Notes: Panel A (Panel B) shows the normalized multipliers of foreign output as a result of a government spending increase 
(net tax cut) equal to 1% of GDP. In our computations we use bilateral exports, net taxes and government spending over GDP 
ratios for 2002. For details on the computations, see Notes to Table 3. Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen 
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Notes: Confidence bands are the 5
th and the 95
th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications.



























































Notes: See Notes to Figure 1.  Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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Notes: See Notes to Figure 1. Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen 
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Notes: in addition to the definitions already included in the main text, we have p = log of price level, i = short-run interest 
rate and rer = log of real multilateral exchange rate. In increase in rer corresponds to a real depreciation. Further, see Notes to 
Figure 1. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: A Panel Analysis 
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Notes: this figure shows the impulse responses of bilateral exports from the foreign country to the domestic country, after, 
respectively, a positive shock (of size 1) to exports (x), a shock to domestic GDP (y) and a depreciation of the foreign real 
exchange rate (rer). Further, see Notes to Figure 1. Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori and Franc Klaassen 
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Figure 6: Impulse response of bilateral foreign exports to domestic government spending and 




















Notes: In each case the size of the fiscal shock equals 1% of GDP. The estimates and the 90% confidence bands are based on 
Monte Carlo simulations, where we multiply 1000 draws for the impulse-response function from the fiscal model by 1000 
draws for the distributed-lag function from the trade model. 